We analyze dynamic assignment problems where agents successively receive different objects (positions, offices, etc.). A finite set of n vertically differentiated indivisible objects are assigned to n agents who live n periods. At each period, a new agent enters society, and the oldest agent retires, leaving his object to be reassigned. A Markovian assignment rule specifies the probability that agents receive objects, and generates a finite Markov chain over the set of assignments. We define independent assignment rules (where the assignment of an object to an agent is independent of the objects currently held by the other agents), efficient assignment rules (where there does not exist another assignment rule with larger expected surplus), and analyze the dynamic properties of the Markov chains generated by assignment rules. When agents are homogenous, we characterize independent convergent assignment rules, and provide sufficient conditions for irreducibility and ergodicity. When agents draw at random their types, we prove that independence and efficiency are incompatible, and study the class of assignment rules which satisfy a property of quasi-convergence. JEL Classification Numbers: C78, D73, M51
Introduction
Economic models of matching and assignment are essentially static, and only consider assignments one at a time. In Gale and Shapley (1962) 's marriage problem, divorce is not allowed and men and women are married forever ; in the roommate problem, college students are assigned to dorms every year, independently of their previous year's assignment ; in the assignment problem (Gale and Shapley (1971) ), workers and firms negotiate their contract irrespective of their history, and in the school choice problem (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003) ), pupils are admitted to schools independently of their previous schooling history. 2 Models of assignment of indivisible goods, like Shapley and Scarf (1974) 's house allocation problem also focus on a single, static, assignment. The history is entirely captured by the current ownership or tenancy structure (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1999) ), and successive reassignments of houses are not considered. 3 However, there exist situations where assignment rules are dynamic, and successive assignments cannot be analyzed separately. For example, consider the assignment of positions to civil servants in centralized systems. In France, teachers who want to transfer are reassigned to high schools according to a complex priority system, which takes into account current position, seniority and on the job seniority, as illustrated in Table 1 . 4 In India, officers of the Indian Administrative Service are also reassigned according to their seniority, current position, career history and rank at the entrance exam to the IAS (Iyer and Mani (2008) ). More generally, successive job assignments inside organizations are decided according to complex rules putting weight on seniority, performance and career history.
Priority systems based on seniority seem to be prevalent in many different settings. Airline pilots and flight attendants get to choose their flight assignments according to seniority.
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Assignment of subsidized housing to potential 2 For a survey of models of two-sided matching, see the excellent monograph by Roth and Sotomayor (1990) . 3 See Thomson (2007) for an exhaustive account of the literature on the allocation of indivisible goods. 4 The exact priority rules are published every year by the French Ministry of Education.
For the 2008 rules, see for example www.acrouen.fr/rectorat/profession mutation/inter bareme.pdf. 5 This emphasis on seniority explains the difficulties in merging pilots' seniority lists when two airline companies contemplate a merger. Northwest Airlines and Delta have recently faced this problem, as pilot associations of the two airlines have so far been unable to agree on a common seniority list. See "NWA pilots set merger conditions," Minneapolis Star Tribune, January 18, 2008. tenants often gives priority to agents who have the highest seniority on the waiting list. In many industries, seniority rules govern priorities for layoffs and promotions (see for example the historical account given by Lee (2004) ).
In other situations, assignment rules do not favor the agents with highest seniority. For example, in order to minimize moving costs, offices of retiring employees are likely to be reassigned to newcomers. This rule favors agents with the lowest seniority, and we will term it the "replacement rule". Alternatively, offices and positions can be reassigned at random. Random assignments based on uniform distributions, termed "uniform rules" are used in a wide range of contexts and deserve a special study.
Dynamic assignment rules differ from static assignment rules in two important ways. First, in a dynamic setting, agents are not only characterized by their current preferences, but also by their history (past assignments and past preferences). Assignment rules can use this information, and condition the allocation of objects to characteristics summarizing the agent's history, like seniority or on the job seniority. Second, in a dynamic setting, the set of agents to whom objects are allocated is not constant. Agents enter and leave the pool of agents to whom objects are allocated. For example, every year, some civil servants retire while others are recruited. Given that the number of positions is fixed, retiring civil servants free their positions, which can be reallocated to other agents, etc.., until all positions are filled. Similarly, if the number of offices is fixed, the allocation of offices in organizations depends on the flow of agents entering and leaving the organization. Agents leaving the organization free their offices, which can be reallocated sequentially until the agents entering the organization are assigned an office.
In this paper, we analyze dynamic assignment rules to allocate a fixed number of objects (offices or positions) to a dynamic set of agents entering and leaving society. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that all agents have the same preferences over the objects, which can thus be ranked according to their desirability.
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. We identify a state of the society with an assignment of objects to agents, where agents are distinguished by their seniority. A Markovian assignment rule specifies how objects are allocated to agents according to the current assignment of objects in society.
We focus attention in this paper on the dynamic properties of the finite Markov chains generated by different assignment rules. We study which assignment rules are convergent (every assignment leads to a unique absorbing state), ergodic (the long run behavior of the chain is independent of the initial assignment) and irreducible (all assignments occur with positive probability in the invariant distribution). We also define different notions of independence, specifying how the assignment of object j to agent i depends on the objects currently held by the other agents. Finally, we consider a static notion of efficiency requiring that there does not exist an alternative assignment rule which generates an expected total surplus at least as large (and sometimes strictly larger) at every state.
We discuss four specific Markovian assignment rules. The seniority rule allocates object j to the oldest agent who holds an object smaller than j. The rank rule allocates object j to the agent holding object j − 1. The uniform rule allocates object j with equal probability to all agents who currently hold objects smaller than j. Finally, the replacement rule allocates the object of the agent leaving the society to the agent entering society.
Our main result shows that any convergent rule satisfying independence must be a weighted combination of the rank and seniority rules. Convergence in our setting can be understood as a condition of equity across cohorts. In a convergent Markov chain, the absorbing state will eventually be reached, and agents entering society at different dates will experience the exact same history. Hence, our analysis gives support to the rank and seniority rules as rules satisfying both a natural notion of independence and a condition of equity.
Ergodic and irreducible rules cannot be characterized as easily. However, we show that any rule which allocated object j to the agent currently holding object j − 1 with positive probability is ergodic. On the other hand, rules which do not allow for transitions across two different assignments µ and µ such that µ(n) = µ (n) = n, like the replacement rule, are not ergodic, and different initial conditions will lead to different long run behaviors of the Markov chain.
We also provide a sufficient condition for irreducibility of independent chains, in terms of the graph of intercommunicability of different states. This condition states that, for an independent assignment rule, any object is reassigned to the entering agent with positive probability and the undirected graph formed by all pairs (i, j) of agents such that an agent holding object i receives object j with positive probability, is connected. This condition will always be satisfied when the probability of allocating object j to the entering agent and the agent holding object j − 1 is positive, and also when the probability of allocating object j to both the entering agent and the agent holding object 1 is positive.
In the second part of the paper, we explore the properties of assignment rules where agents are heterogeneous, and draw at random a type before entering society. We first show that independence becomes a very strong condition when agents are heterogeneous, as it implies that assignments are independent of the agent's type. Assuming that the surplus is a supermodular function of the quality of the object and the agent's ordered types, efficiency requires an assortative matching between objects and types. We thus can study whether or not efficient assignment rules exist, and first show that there exists and incompatibility between independence and efficiency. When agents' types are drawn at random, the evolution of states is governed by two simultaneous forces: the exogenous draw of type profiles and the endogenous evolution of assignments. We define quasi-convergent assignment rules as rules for which the unique recurrent set only admits one assignment per type profile, thereby generalizing convergent rules. This generalization captures the same equity consideration as before, as any two agents born at different points in time the same societies will experience the same history if the assignment rule is quasi-convergent. We can easily characterize quasi-convergent independent rules. Whether there exist assignment rules satisfying both our notions of equity and efficiency (quasi-convergent efficient rules) remains an open question that we hope to settle shortly.
Related literature
We situate our paper with respect to the existing literature in economics and operations research. As noted above, economic models of assignment do not allow for the type of dynamic changes in the population and objects that we consider here. The papers which are more closely related to ours in this literature are papers by Moulin and Strong (2002) and (2003) which consider axiomatic rules to allocate balls entering in succession into multicolor urns. As in our model, the state of the urns varies over time, and the allocation depends on the current state and influences the transition across states. However, in all other respects, the problems we study are very different.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature in operations research and computer science on queuing and assignment has not considered the problem we study in this paper. Typically, problems of queuing in operations research do not model preferences of agents over the servers, do not identify agents who enter repeatedly the system and whose utility is defined over a sequence of assignments, and do not impose, as we do, individual rationality conditions, stating that an agent cannot be assigned a lower object than the one he currently holds.
In management, the literature on Markov manpower systems also analyzes the allocation of agents to vertically differentiated positions as a Markov process.
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But the focus of the literature is very different from our approach. Studies of manpower planning investigate how planners can achieve a fixed target (in terms of sizes of different grades in the hierarchy of the organization) by controlling promotion and recruitment flows. By contrast, our study is based on the structure and properties of allocation rules which determine the reassignment of objects at every period.
In personnel and labor economics, seniority rules for promotion and layoffs have been analyzed, both theoretically and empirically. (See Lazear (1995) ). Theoretical models emphasize seniority promotion rules as a way to provide incentives to worker to acquire firm-specific human capital (Carmichael (1983) ). Empirical studies of internal labor markets, like Chiappori, Salanié and Valentin (1999)'s study of promotions and careers in a large firm in France, provide a more complex and nuanced view of the effects of seniority, human capital acquisition and innate abilities on career histories.
The Model

Markovian assignment rules
We consider a society I of n agents indexed by their age, i = 1, 2, ..., n, and n vertically differentiated indivisible goods, indexed by j = 1, 2, ..., n in the set J . Time is discrete and runs as t = 1, 2, .... Each agent lives for exactly n periods, and at each date t, one agent dies and leaves the society whereas another agent enters the society.
Definition 1 An assignment µ is a mapping from I to J assigning to every agent i, the object j = µ(i). Given that I and J have the same cardinality, an assignment can be identified with a permutation over the finite set {1, 2, ...n}.
A state of the society is totally described by the assignment of objects to agents. Hence there are n! states in a society of n agents, each corresponding to a different permutation over the finite set {1, 2, ...n}.
We now consider the dynamical structure of the society. Let µ t denote the state of the economy at date t. At the beginning of period t + 1, the oldest agent alive in period t relinquishes object µ t (n) and leaves the society. A new agent enters with no object -by convention we denote the null object by 0 -and agents i = 2, 3, ..., n retain the objects they were assigned in the previous period, µ t (i − 1). A new assignment will then be chosen, to allocate object µ t (n) to one of the current members of society. The assignment of object µ t (n) will in turn, free a new object to be reassigned, etc.. The cascade of assignments will end when the new agent is assigned an object.
Definition 2 A truncated assignment ν, given some object j is a mapping from I \ {1} to J \ {j}, reflecting the assignment of the objects in J \ {j} to the n − 1 oldest agents in the society.
We focus on assignment rules which only depend on the current truncated assignment ν of objects to agents, and not on the entire history of assignments in the society. Assignment rules which possess this Markovian property are called Markovian assignment rules. An assignment rule allocates any object j to those agents who currently possess an object k < j. We suppose that agents cannot be forced to give back their current object. The assignment rule must satisfy an individual rationality condition, and cannot assign to agent i an object j < ν(i). Formally, we define:
The number α j (ν, i) denotes the probability that agent i receives object j given the truncated assignment ν.
Examples of Markovian assignment rules
We now describe four different Markovian assignment rules which have a simple interpretation. The seniority rule assigns object j to the oldest agent with an object smaller than j, α j (ν, i) = 1 if and only if i = max{k|ν(k) < j}. The rank rule assigns object j to the agent who currently owns object j − 1,
The uniform rule assigns object j to all agents who own objects smaller than j with equal probability,
for all i such that ν(i) < j. The replacement rule assigns object j to the entering agent, α j (ν, i) = 1 if and only if i = 1.
Notice that some common rules are not Markovian. For example, rules based on on the job seniority require information about the number of periods during which agent i has owned object j, an information which cannot be recovered from the current assignment ν.
Independent assignment rules
A Markovian assignment rule may condition the assignment of object j to agent i on the objects currently held by the other agents (the truncated assignment ν). A simple property of Markovian assignment rules is independence, stating that the assignment of object j to player i does not depend on the current assignment of objects held by the other players:
Definition 4 A Markovian assignment rule α satisfies independence if and only if, for any j, for any
The independence property is appealing because it states that an agent's assignment only depends on his characteristics (age and object currently held) and not on the characteristics of the other agents. A stronger property, strong independence states that an agent's assignment is independent of his age:
Definition 5 A Markovian assignment rule α satisfies strong independence if and only if, for any j, for any
If an assignment rule is strongly independent, it is fully characterized by the probability of assigning object j to an agent holding object k < j. Abusing notations, we will denote this probability by α j (k). Notice that the rank, uniform and replacement rules are all strongly independent.
The seniority rule is not independent, but satisfies a weaker independence property, stating that the assignment α j (ν, i) only depends on the truncated assignment of objects for agents who currently hold objects smaller than j and are thus eligible to receive object j. Formally:
Definition 6 A Markovian assignment rule α satisfies weak independence if and only if, for any j, for any i, for any
The following Lemma characterizes assignment rules satisfying independence, and highlights the gap between independence and strong independence.
Lemma 1 If a Markovian rule α satisfies independence, then for any
Lemma 1 shows that if a Markovian assignment rule satisfies independence, the assignment of any object j < n is strongly independent, and fully determined by the probabilities α j (k) of assigning object j to an agent currently holding object k < j. However, this property does not hold for the assignment of the highest object , n. For the assignment of the last object, the only constraint imposed by independence is that, for any two assignments which only differ in the positions of i and j, the total probability assigned to agents i and j be constant. As the following simple example shows, there exist assignment rules satisfying independence which allocate object n with different probabilities to two agents of different ages holding the same object.
Example 1 Let n = 3. Consider the assignment of object 3 and the two truncated assignments ν(2) = 1, ν(3) = 2, ν (2) = 2, ν (3) = 1. Independence puts no restriction on the assignment rule α 3 , as there is no agent i for which ν(i) = ν (i). Now, we must have:
. This implies that the assignment rules satisfying independence are characterized by three numbers, α 3 (ν, 1), α 3 (ν, 2) and α 3 (ν , 2), but it does not imply that α 3 
Convergent, irreducible and ergodic assignment rules
Starting with any assignment µ 0 , any Markovian assignment rule α generates a finite Markov chain over the set of assignments. More precisely, we can define the probability of reaching state µ from state µ, p(µ |µ) as follows:
Consider the sequence of agents i
This sequence of agents corresponds to the unique sequence of reallocations of goods for which society moves from assignment µ to assignment µ . First, the good held by the last agent at date t, µ(n) is assigned to agent i The probability of reaching µ from µ is thus simply the probability that the sequence of reallocations of goods between agents i 0 , ..., i M is realized:
where ν
Having defined the Markov chain over assignments, we now consider the dynamic properties of this chain, and relate it to the Markovian assignment rules. The following definitions are borrowed from classical books on finite Markov chains (Kemeny and Snell (1960) , Isaacson and Madsen (1976) ).
Definition 7 Two states i and j intercommunicate if there exists a path in the Markov chain from i to j and a path from j to i.
Definition 8 A set of states C is closed if, for any states i ∈ C, k /
∈ C, the transition probability between i and k is zero.
Definition 9
A recurrent set is a closed set of states such that all states in the set intercommunicate. If the recurrent set is a singleton, it is called an absorbing state.
Definition 10 A Markovian assignment rule α is convergent if the induced Markov chain is convergent (admits a unique absorbing state, and any initial assignment converges to the absorbing state).
Definition 11 A Markovian assignment rule α is irreducible if the induced Markov chain is irreducible (the only recurrent set is the entire state set).
Definition 12 A Markovian assignment rule α is ergodic if the induced Markov chain is ergodic (has a unique recurrent set).
9 9 This definition of ergodicity does not agree with the definition given by Isaacson and Masden (1976) who also require all recurrent states to be aperiodic, so that an invariant distribution exists, nor with Kemeny and Snell (1960) 's definition where an ergodic Markov chain is defined by the fact that the only recurrent set is the entire state set. For lack of better terminology, we call ergodic a finite Markov chain such that the long run behavior of the chain (whether it is a cycle or an invariant distribution) is independent of the initial conditions.
We finally define a dynamic notion of equity, based on the idea that two agents born at different dates must be treated identically in the long run. 
Markovian assignment rules among three agents
In this Section, we completely characterize the Markovian assignment rules among three agents. If n = 3, there are six possible assignments defined by:
.
Given the constraint that iν(i)≤j α j (i, ν) = 1, not all transitions among states can occur with positive probability, and the transition matrix must display the following zero entries:
Alternatively, Figure 1 below illustrates the transitions between states in the Markov process induced by an assignment rule putting positive probabilities on all feasible transitions:
We now examine in turn the four assignment rules described above.
The seniority rule
The seniority rule is represented by the transition matrix: 
The transitions between states are represented in Figure 2 , which shows that the seniority rule is in fact convergent.
The rank rule
The rank rule is represented by the transition matrix: 
The transitions between states are represented in Figure 3 , which shows that the rank rule is convergent.
The uniform rule
The uniform rule is represented by the transition matrix: 
The replacement rule
The replacement rule is represented by the transition matrix: 
The Markov chain is not ergodic. As shown in Figure 4 , there are two cyclical recurrent sets of period 3.
3 Dynamic properties of Markovian assignment rules
Convergent Markovian assignement rules
We first characterize convergent assignment rules. Notice that, by construction, an agent is never reassigned an object of lower value than the object he currently holds. Hence, for any i = 1, ..., n − 1, µ
If an assignment µ is an absorbing state, we must have
Hence, at an absorbing state, the assignment must be monotone, assigning higher objects to older agents. The only monotone assignment is the identity assignment ι for which ι(i) = i for all i = 1, ...n. Hence, the only candidate absorbing state is the identity assignment ι. This observation also shows that an assignment rule is time invariant if and only if it is convergent. Proposition 1 Both the seniority and rank assignment rules are convergent.
Proposition 1 shows that both the seniority and rank rules are convergent and that the absorbing state is reached in at most n periods. Furthermore, a careful inspection of the proof of the Proposition reveals that any Markovian assignment rule which can be written as a convex combination of the rank and seniority rule, is also convergent. However, the seniority and rank rules (and their convex combinations) are not the only convergent rules. A complete characterization of convergent assignment rules is difficult, because the condition guaranteeing that the identity assignment is absorbing only pins down the assignment rule for the truncated assignmentsν j , whereν
When assignments are independent of the assignments of the other agents, progress can be made and the next Theorem characterizes the one-parameter family of independent convergent rules.
Theorem 1 An assignment rule α is independent and convergent if and only if
Theorem 1 characterizes the family of independent and convergent assignment rules as rules which allocate any object j < n according to the rank rule, and allocate object n according to a convex combination of the rank and seniority rules. If, in addition, we require the assignment rule to be strongly independent, if α n (ν, n) = 1 when ν(n) = n − 1, we must have α n (n − 1) = 1, so that:
The only strongly independent, convergent assignment rule is the rank rule.
Ergodic assignment rules
We first recall some definitions of special permutations.
Definition 14
A permutation from a set of n elements to itself is a cycle, denoted κ, if π(i) = π(i + 1) for all i = 1, 2, .., n and π(n) = 1. 
Definition 15 A permutation from a set of n elements to itself is an
where it is understood that τ 1 , the identity permutation, is just added for the sake of completeness, and to show that the composition of permutation ends.
We are now ready to provide a simple characterization of ergodic assignment rules based on the accessibility of an assignment where the highest object is assigned to the oldest player. Theorem 2 is based on the simple observation that any recurrent set must contain an assignment for which µ(n) = n, so that in order to check ergodicity, one only needs to check that there exists an assignment assigning the highest object to the oldest agent which can be reached from any assignment assigning the highest object to the oldest agent. This condition is always violated for the replacement rule, for which the set of states can be decomposed into n cycles, each cycle containing a single assignment such that µ(n) = n, and for which there is no path between the cycles. Proposition 2 does not pin down a simple condition guaranteeing the existence of a path in the Markov chain from an assignment µ to an assignment µ with µ(n) = µ (n) = n. A simple sufficient condition is that any object i is assigned with positive probability to an agent of age i holding object i − 1:
Corollary 2 generalizes our result on the convergence of the rank and seniority rules, by showing that any assignment rule which assigns object i to agent i when he holds object i − 1 with positive probability (a condition satisfied both by the rank and seniority rule) must be ergodic. Furthermore, if the condition of Corollary 2 is satisfied, then it is possible to reach the identity assignment ι from itself, so that the period of the recurrent state ι is equal to one. As all states in a recurrent set must have the same period (Isaacson and Masden (1976) , Theorem II.2.2 p.54), all states in the unique recurrent set are aperiodic. Hence, the Markov chain is ergodic in the stronger sense of Isaacson and Masden (1976) , and admits a unique invariant distribution.
The sufficient condition identified in Corollary 2 is not necessary. As the following four player example shows, a Markovian assignment rule may be ergodic even when it allows some "gaps" (situations where the probability of assigning object j to the agent holding object j − 1 is equal to zero).
Example 2 Let n = 4. Consider the strongly independent assignment rule
Let all states such that µ(4) = 4 be ordered as in Subsection 2.5. In addition, define the states:
(1, 4, 3, 2) µ 10 : (1, 4, 2, 3) . Figure 5 illustrates the transitions between these states and shows that there exists a path leading to the identity matching from any other state, proving that the assignment rule is ergodic.
Irreducible assignment rules
In this Subsection, we characterize irreducible assignment rules, generating irreducible finite Markov chains, where any state can be reached from any other state. Theorem 3 provides a characterization of irreducible assignment rules which relies on two conditions: (i) assumes that replacement (the allocation of any object to the entering agent) occurs with positive probability at all states, (ii) assumes that any two assignments which allocate the highest object to the oldest agent are related through a sequence of elementary permutations, with cycles and (1, i) transpositions such that any transposition in the sequence is followed by a cycle.
Theorem 3 An assignment rule α is irreducible if and only if (i) For all j, all truncated assignments ν of objects in
At first glance, condition (ii) may appear to be a mere rephrasing of the irreducibility condition -guaranteeing that any state can be reached from any state. However, condition (ii) is weaker than the irreducibility condition, as it only applies to a set of states of cardinality (n − 1)! rather than n! Condition (ii) also focusses attention on a special sequence of "elementary permutations" rather than arbitrary assignments. When condition (i) is satisfied, any path from a state µ to a state µ can be generated through elementary permutations. Hence, in the direction of sufficiency, requiring that the states can be reached though elementary permutations is not more demanding than requiring that the states can be reached through any arbitrary reassignment. In the direction of necessity, checking that there is no elementary permutations leading from one state to another is easier than checking that states cannot be reached through any reassignment. Furthermore, the description of elementary permutations will serve as a building block for the analysis of irreducible assignment rules satisfying independence. Theorem 4 provides a simple sufficient condition to check whether an independent assignment rule is irreducible. This condition is satisfied when the set of states for which transitions occur with positive probability is rich enough. For example, it is always satisfied for the uniform assignment rule where α j (i) > 0 for all i ≤ j, or when the probability of assigning object j to an agent holding j − 1 is positive, α j (j − 1) > 0 (in which case the graph G(α) is a connected line), or if the probability of assigning object j to the agent holding object 1 is positive for all j, α j (1) > 0 (in which case the graph G(α) is a connected star with 1 as the hub).
However, as shown by the following example, the condition is not necessary. There exist irreducible assignment rules for which the graph G(α) is not connected. In this Example, the graph G(α) only contains the link (1, 3) and is not connected. However, all assignments with µ(n) = 4 intercommunicate, as illustrated in Figure 6 , which uses the same ordering of three player assignments as that used in Subsection 2.5.
Markovian assignment rules among heterogeneous agents
In this Section, we extend the model by allowing for heterogeneity across agents. More precisely, we suppose that agents independently draw types (or abilities) which affect the value of the surplus formed in any matching.
Assuming that surpluses are supermodular functions of objects and types, efficient assignments require to assign higher objects to agents with higher types. Of course, this requirement conflicts with the use of simple seniority and rank rules, and the object of the analysis is to characterize richer classes of rules, which take into account agent's types as well as their histories.
A model with heterogeneous agents
Let K = {1, 2, ..., m} be a finite ordered set of types indexed by k. At every period, the type of the entering agent is drawn according to an independent draw of a finite probability distribution q(k). The set of objects and types are ordered in such a way that the surplus obtained by matching an agent of type k with an object j, σ(k, j) is strictly supermodular: If k > k and j > j,
Hence, total surplus in society will be maximized by assigning objects of higher quality to agents with higher types.
A state s is now defined both by an assignment µ and a type profile θ, s = (µ, θ) where
• The assignment µ is a one-to-one mapping from the set I of agents to the set J of objects,
• The type profile θ is a mapping from the set I of agents to the set K of types.
An assignment rule α is now a collection of mappings α j (ν, θ, i), defining the probability of assigning object j to agent i given the truncated assignment ν and the type profile θ. As before, the assignment rule must satisfy:
As before, we define an assignment rule to be independent if the assignment of object j to agent i only depends on the characteristics of agent i:
Finally, an assignment rule is strongly independent if the assignment of object j to agent i only depends on the type and object currently held by agent i:
The following lemma shows that, if an assignment rule is independent, assignment cannot depend on an agent's type
Lemma 3 Let α be an independent assignment rule among heterogeneous agents. Then, for any θ, θ , any j, ν and i, α j (ν, θ, i) = α j (ν, θ , i).
With heterogeneous players, independence thus puts a strong restriction on the assignment rule, and limits the set of rules to those rules which satisfy independence for homogeneous players (e.g. the rank or uniform rules, which do not take into account players' types).
Finally, we may now define new rules, using the additional dimension given by agent's types:
Definition 17 The type-rank rule is defined by
α j (ν, θ, i) = 1 if θ(i) ≥ θ(k) for all k such that ν(k) ≤ j and ν(i) > ν(l) for all l such that θ(l) = θ(i) and ν(l) ≤ j.
Definition 18 The type-uniform rule is defined by
All these rules use a lexicographic ordering: they first select the set of agents of highest type who may receive the object. If this set contains more than one agent, the rules use a tie-breaking rule (seniority, rank or uniform distribution) to allocate the object.
Markov chains with heterogeneous agents
Given an assignment rule α and a probability distribution q over types, we can compute the transition probability from state s to state s :
• First, the conditional probability of type profile θ given type profile θ is given by:
• Second, given the new type profile θ , and the assignment rule α, construct sequences of reassignments as in Subsection 2.4 to obtain p(µ |µ).
When agents are heterogeneous, total surplus varies with the assignments, and different assignment rules result in different total surpluses. We thus define a notion of efficiency of assignment rules, based on the following (static) criterion.
Definition 19 An assignment rule α is efficient if there does not exist another assignment rule α , such that, for all state
with strict inequality for some state.
Some remarks are in order. First, because the assignment rule α can be made conditional on the type profile θ , definitions of efficiency ex ante and at the interim stage (after the type profile θ has been drawn), are equivalent.
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Second, this definition of efficiency is static, and only considers total surplus at the next step of the Markov chain, and not the surplus generated by the two assignment rules α and α along the entire path of the Markov chain. Third, by using this definition we impose the same constraint on the assignment rules α and α , and in particular, we do not consider efficiency improving reassignments which would violate the individual rationality condition, namely the fact that an agent holding object j cannot be reassigned an object of value smaller than j.
Finally, while the notions of ergodic and irreducible assignment rules are well defined, it is clear that when agents are heterogeneous, assignment rules are never convergent. The random drawing of the type of the entering agent every period introduces a source of randomness in the Markov chain which prevents the existence of absorbing states. However, distinguishing between the two sources of randomness (one linked to the exogenous drawing of the type of the entering agent every period, and one to the dynamics of reassignments), we propose the following notion of quasi-convergence In words, a quasi-convergent Markov chain ultimately settles in a recurrent state, where a single assignment arises for every type profile θ. When there is a unique type, this definition is of course equivalent to convergence to a unique absorbing state. It is also related to the following extension of the notion of time invariance. 
Definition 21 A Markov chain with heterogeneous agents is time-invariant if there exists T > 0 such that, any two agents born at t, t > T facing the same societies, experience the same history. For any two agents i and i entering society at dates t and t where θt
+ τ = θt + τ (i ) for τ = 0, 1, ..., n− 1, µ t+τ (i) = µ
Quasi-convergent, efficient and independent assignment rules
When agents are heterogeneous, as noted above, independence of assignment rules is a very strong restriction. Our first result shows that this restriction is incompatible with efficiency.
Theorem 5 Suppose that the set K contains at least two types. Then there is no assignment rule satisfying independence and efficiency.
The existence and characterization of independent and quasi-convergent assignment rules is a direct consequence of Lemma 3 and Theorem 1. Because independent assignment rules are independent of agent's types, the family of independent quasi-convergent assignment rules is exactly identical to the family of independent, convergent assignment rules for identical players. Hence the characterization of Theorem 1 remains valid, and independent, quasi-convergent assignment rules are convex combinations of the seniority and rank rules.
The next step will be to study the existence of efficient, quasi-convergent assignment rules.
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider two assignments ν and ν such that
Next, consider two assignments ν, ν such that
Proof of Proposition 1: We first check that the identity assignment is indeed an absorbing state. A necessary and sufficient condition for this to occur is that:
whereν
Both the seniority and rank assignment rules satisfy this condition, as j is at the same time the oldest agent eligible to receive object j and the agent with the highest ranked object in the matchingν j . Next we show that starting from any initial state µ, there exists a time t at which the Markov chain is absorbed into the identity assignment ι.
In the rank rule, if µ(n) = k, all objects j = 1, 2, ..., k are reassigned to the agents sequentially. In particular, at period 1, object 1 will be reassigned to the entering agent so that µ 1 (1) = 1. At period 2, object 2 is reassigned to agent 2 (who currently holds object 1) and object 1 is reassigned to the entering agent, so that µ 
The preceding argument shows that, starting from any µ at period 0, in the seniority rule µ 1 (1) = 1. Furthermore, at period 2, object 1 must be reassigned to the entering agent so that µ 2 (1) = 1, µ 2 (2) = 2. We thus conclude that µ n = ι, namely, the Markov chain is absorbed into the identity assignment in at most n periods.
Proof of Theorem 1: By Proposition 1, the rank rule and the seniority rules are convergent, so that the rule α, which is a convex combination of the seniority and rank rules, is also convergent.
Next suppose that the rule α satisfies independence and is convergent. Because it is convergent, the identity assignment is an absorbing state, so that
By independence, from Lemma 1, α j (j − 1) = α j (ν j , j) = 1 for all j < n. Furthermore, by independence again, from Lemma 1, for any two assignments ν, ν which only differ in the position of two agents, the total probability of assigning object n to the two agents is constant. As α n (ν n , n) + α n (ν n , k) = 1 for all k < n, we conclude that, for all ν,
Next construct two different truncated assignments ν and ν such that ν
Applying independence again, for any ν, ν such that ν(n) = i < n − 1 and ν (n) = j < n − 1, we have:
for any ν such that ν(n) = n − 1, establishing the result.
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose first that the condition holds. Because object n is reassigned at least every n periods, and can only be reassigned when µ(n) = n, any recurrent set must contain an assignment for which µ(n) = n. Suppose by contradiction that there are two recurrent sets, each containing an assignment where µ(n) = n, denoted µ 1 and µ 2 . If the condition holds, there exists an assignment µ with µ (n) = n which can be reached from both µ 1 and µ 2 , contradicting the fact that µ 1 and µ 2 belong to two distinct recurrent sets.
Conversely, suppose that the condition is violated and that there is a single recurrent set. There must exist one assignment µ with µ (n) = n in the recurrent set. However, if the condition is violated there exists another assignment µ with µ(n) = n such that there is no path in the Markov chain from µ to µ , contradicting the fact that there is a single recurrent set.
Proof of Corollary 2:
We will show the existence of a path to the identity assignment ι. Because object 1 is reassigned at least every n periods, there exists a time t at which µ such that, at each step, with positive probability, the object held by the last player is assigned to player i, and the object held by player i to the entering player. Hence, one can construct a path between µ 0 and µ 1 , concluding the sufficiency part of the proof. (Necessity) Suppose first that condition (i) is violated, i.e. there exists j and a truncated assignment ν of objects in J \ j such that α j (ν, 1) = 0. Consider the assignment µ such that µ(1) = j, µ(i) = ν(i) for i = 2, ..., n.For this assignment to be reached, it must be that object j is assigned to the entering player with positive probability when all other players hold the objects given by the truncated assignment ν. Hence, if α j (ν, 1) = 0, assignment µ can never be reached from any other state, contradicting the fact that the Markov chain is irreducible.
Next suppose that condition (ii) is violated. We will first show that any reassignment from a matching µ to a matching µ , π = µ • Then, during n − 1 periods, assign the object held by the last agent to the entering agent ( apply κ n−1
)
After this first cycle of n permutations, we have that, for all Hence, if for any sequence of permutations alternating cycles and transpositions, state µ cannot be reached from state µ, we conclude that there is no path in the Markov chain from µ to µ , and the Markov chain induced by the assignment rule is not irreducible.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Given Theorem 3, we need to show that there exists a path from any assignment µ such that µ(n) = n to any assignment µ such that µ (n) = n. The mapping µ −1
• µ is a permutation over {1, ..., n} which leaves the last element invariant. As any permutation can be decomposed into a sequence of transpositions, the induced permutation over the elements in {1, ..., n−1} can be decomposed onto a sequence of transpositions
We now show that there exists a path in the Markov chain corresponding to this sequence of transpositions. We first consider the first transposition, . Because the graph G(α) is connected, there exists a sequence
(j q ) be the agent holding good j q in µ. We can decompose the transposition τ i 1 ,i 2 as:
To check this equality, notice that, for any i not included in the sequence i
Similarly,
Finally, for i q , q = 1, Q, We now construct a path from µ to µ • τ i 1 ,i 2 . We first apply cycle κ for n − i 1 + 1 periods, so that µ • κ n−i 1 +1
(1) = j 1 (i 2 − i 1 + 1), and we now apply the transposition τ i 2 −i 1 +1 followed by i 1 − 1 cycles to finally obtain µ • τ i 1 ,i 2 .
A similar construction can be applied to construct a path from µ to any composition of µ with a sequence of transpositions, concluding the proof of the Theorem. The assignment rule α agrees with the assignment rule α everywhere except for the assignment of object j aith truncated assignment ν and type profile θ, where α shifts the positive weight assigned to agent i to the entering agent.
Now consider a state s. If the type profile at state s does not satisfy θ(i) = 1 for i = 1, .., n − 1, the two assignment rules are identical. Similarly, if the assignment µ at state s is such that the assignment rule α does not put positive weight on a path where the truncated reassignment ν is reached, the two assignment rules are identical.
Otherwise, whenever the type profile θ(1) = m, θ(i) = 1, i = 2, ..., n is drawn, assignment rule α results in a total surplus: i =1
σ(1, µ(i)) + σ(m, µ(1)),
where by construction µ(1) < j. Assignment rule α instead leads to a total surplus i =1
σ(1, µ(i)) + σ(m, j).
The difference between the two surpluses is given by: σ(m, j) + σ (1, µ(1)) − σ(m, µ(1)) − σ(1, j) , which, by strict supermodularity of the surplus function σ, is positive. For any other type profile the two assignments are identical, showing that the assignment rule α is dominated at state s by the assignment rule α , and cannot be efficient.
We now consider case (b), where the assignment rule is the replacement rule. Consider an assignment rule α which only differs from α for a type profile θ such that θ(i) = m for i = 2, ..., n and θ(1) = 1. Hence, by the same reasoning as above, the replacement rule is strictly dominated by a rule which shifts the weight α j (ν, θ, 1) to an agent with the highest type, say agent n. This shows that the replacement rule cannot be efficient. 
